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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Federalism has played a perplexing role in the development of 
corporate governance policies in the United States.  Federalism’s 
appealing attributes – diversity, competition, innovation and efficiency – 
are touted as core values by defenders of Delaware’s dominance in 
corporate law.  At the same time, the need for a “national solution” is 
often emphasized in increasingly successful appeals to limit the states’ role 
in regulating securities transactions and adjudicating securities fraud 
claims.  The inconsistent application of federalism principles in these 
closely related fields is puzzling.   
Why should a set of values so central to the corporate law debate be 
set aside so readily in discussions of securities law policy?  This Article 
explores this question and concludes that the protracted debate regarding 
the proper division of authority among state and federal regulatory actors 
is an unfortunate distraction.  Because state and federal regulators alike 
have vast authority and experience in regulating corporate conduct and 
securities practices, academic discussion should focus more on how best to 
coordinate action among diverse regulators to maximize the benefits of 
concurrent authority and minimize its burdens.   
The Article proposes an integrated approach to corporate 
regulation in which state and federal regulators are equally engaged in 
setting corporate governance policies.  An integrated approach can help 
facilitate democratic deliberation, improving the prospect that government 
policies will reflect the public will.  An integrated perspective can also free 
academic discussions from unnecessary distractions created by unavailing 
efforts to constrain corporate law and securities law within separate and 
distinct spheres. 
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DOES FEDERALISM MATTER?: 
ITS PERPLEXING ROLE IN THE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE DEBATE 
Renee M. Jones*
INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of federalism plays a curious role in shaping our 
corporate governance policy.  Despite the absence of a firm 
constitutional grounding, federalism arguments have served as a 
powerful conceptual barrier to sustained federal engagement in 
corporate governance policy.   
When carefully examined, however, notions of federalism add 
little to the corporate governance debate.  A review of academic 
literature and judicial opinions that seek to enforce notions of 
federalism shows that efforts to define appropriate boundaries 
between federal and state authority over corporate regulation are 
incoherent at best.  In the end, such efforts fail because no workable 
conception exists on which to base such divisions. 
The incoherence of federalism doctrines in corporate governance 
is more than a mere theoretical problem.  Efforts to define separate 
spheres of authority for corporate law and securities regulation 
often have the practical effect of thwarting the policy objectives of 
legislators and administrative agencies.  Exhortations of federalism 
also serve as rhetorical ammunition for those opposed to the 
expansion of federal engagement in corporate governance.  In this 
way, appeals to federalism frequently serve to obfuscate rather than 
enlighten, distracting policymakers from addressing important 
substantive concerns. 
When evaluating federalism’s application to questions of 
corporate regulation it is important to emphasize that the U.S. 
 * Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School.  This article was written during a 
fellowship at the Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics, Harvard University.  I am 
grateful to the Center for its support.  I would also like to thank George Brown and 
Lawrence Cunningham for comments on early drafts.  This Article also benefited from 
comments from William Bratton, Martha Chamallas, Alan Palmiter, Sidney Shapiro and 
other participants in the Wake Forest Law Review Symposium on Modern Federalism and 
American Business. 
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Constitution imposes no limits on the reach of federal power.  Under 
the interstate commerce clause it is beyond serious question that 
Congress can preempt the field of corporate law if it so chooses.1  
Therefore, federalism arguments advanced in the corporate arena 
are properly understood as normative, rather than constitutional, 
claims. 2
The protracted debate regarding the proper division of authority 
among state and federal regulatory actors is an unfortunate 
distraction.  State and federal regulators alike have vast authority 
and experience in regulating corporate conduct and securities 
practices.  Therefore, academic discussion should focus on how to 
best coordinate action among the diverse regulators so as to 
maximize the benefits of concurrent authority and minimize its 
burdens.3
The concept of dynamic federalism, which I have described 
elsewhere, can help to shift conversation in that direction.4  
Dynamic federalism emphasizes the benefits of sustained 
interaction between state and federal regulators.  This model 
represents modern reality and fairly reflects the framers’ vision of 
our political and constitutional structure.5   
This Article examines the manner in which federalism concepts 
have affected the policy debate on corporate governance in the 
United States.  It argues that efforts to carve out separate realms 
for federal and state regulation have led to the emergence of a 
number of unstable and imprecise distinctions, including artificial 
demarcations between corporate and securities law, internal affairs 
and external affairs, and conduct standards and disclosure rules.6  
It also shows how attempts to confine state regulation in securities 
 1. William W. Bratton & Joseph McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate 
Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ___, ____ (2006) (“The pattern of restraint does not 
follow from a constitutional mandate . . . .”). 
 2. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 
REG., Spring 2003, at 26, 26 (“The question of who gets to regulate public corporations thus 
is not one of constitutional law but rather of prudence and federalism.”). 
 3. See infra Part II.C. 
 4. See Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and 
Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 109 (2004) [hereinafter Jones, Dynamic 
Federalism].   
 5. Id., at 121-22. 
 6. Robert Ahdieh, From “Federalization” to “Mixed Governance” in Corporate 
Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 731 (2005) (“No line of 
sufficient impermeability to categorically exclude any and all possible federal interventions 
into corporate law can be identified.”); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1, at ___ (“The 
internal affairs norm is fragile, both descriptively and normatively.”); Richard W. Painter, 
Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of 
Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (1998) (noting the cumbersome distinction between 
corporate and securities law). 
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law to “local” issues and leave “national” issues to Congress and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have become 
hopelessly confused, creating further doctrinal incoherence.7
Part I describes the basic federalism arguments that dominate 
debates on corporate and securities law policies.  It notes the 
instability of many concepts developed to maintain federalism 
distinctions and the inconsistent manner in which federalism 
arguments are invoked in the related fields of corporate and 
securities law.  Part II positions the discussion of federalism and 
corporate governance within a broader context provided by 
constitutional law commentary.  It notes the “sphere of influence” 
perspective reflected in the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism 
jurisprudence8 and catalogues various critiques of the sphere 
mentality.  It also points to efforts by scholars to shift constitutional 
law discussions away from a focus on divided spheres and toward an 
emphasis on the interaction between federal and state governments.  
Part III argues for an integrated approach to corporate regulation.  
It asserts that corporate and securities law should be treated as an 
integrated whole, with state and federal regulators all playing an 
important role in developing policies.  This Part argues that an 
integrated approach offers several advantages from the perspective 
of democratic policymaking. An integrated approach can also 
liberate corporate literature from distractions created by unavailing 
efforts to maintain separate spheres of state and federal authority in 
corporate governance. 
I. FEDERALISM CONCEPTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A.  Corporate Law—The States’ Sphere 
 
A background assumption that grounds much of corporate law 
scholarship is the notion that a separate sphere of state sovereignty 
exists in corporate law.  This sphere perspective is reflexively 
asserted, both as a descriptive matter and prescriptively by 
commentators and the courts.9  Unfortunately, the insistence on a 
 7. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1514-15 
(2006) (noting that the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 gives rise to the possibility of parallel class 
actions proceedings in state and federal court, with different standards governing claims 
asserted on identical facts). 
 8. George D. Brown, Counterrevolution?—National Criminal Law After Raich, 66 
OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 1011 (2005). 
 9. See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter, The CTS Gambit: Stanching the Federalization of 
Corporate Law, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 445, 451 (1991) (“It is a deep-rooted tradition that the 
ordering of the relationship between managers and shareholders—corporate law—rests 
primarily with the states.”).   
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separate state sphere for corporate regulation rests upon a series of 
untenable distinctions.  Despite their tenuous nature, these fragile 
distinctions have been reified in corporate commentary and judicial 
doctrine. 
 
1. Internal Affairs as a Bulwark   
 
Because no constitutional basis exists for limiting federal power 
in corporate law, corporate federalism claims rely principally on the 
appeal to a tradition loosely-termed “the internal affairs doctrine.”  
What is often referred to as the internal affairs doctrine actually 
incorporates two distinct concepts.  The first is a choice of law rule 
which simply provides that when disputes arise between corporate 
participants (shareholders and directors, for example), the law of the 
state of incorporation governs the dispute.10
The second conception of internal affairs is less definitive.  It is 
best described as an informal understanding among legislators, 
sometimes enforced by the courts, that matters concerning the 
internal affairs of a corporation are the province of state law and not 
a proper subject for federal regulation.11  As generally understood, 
internal affairs include those rules governing the relationship 
among directors, executives, and shareholders.12
The problem with this conception of internal affairs is that it is 
unavoidably circular. What constitute internal affairs are simply 
those matters that the federal government has permitted states to 
continue to regulate.13  This conception also inaccurately implies 
that federal rules do not address many topics that, according to the 
general definition, ought to be considered to be part of internal 
affairs.  A significant amount of federal law addresses matters such 
as shareholder voting, executive compensation, accounting practices, 
and insider trading, topics that are part of the “internal affairs” 
domain.14  Everyone acknowledges these federal forays into internal 
affairs, but they are frequently characterized as isolated exceptions 
to the internal affairs rule.15
 10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971). 
 11. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1, at___; Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 596-97 (2003). 
 12. LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 173 (4th ed. 1988). 
 13. See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 36 (2000) (“[C]orporate 
internal affairs pretty much encompass the subject matter of those state laws typically 
referred to as corporate law.”). 
 14. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1, at ___. 
 15. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 13, at 241 (“In several areas . . . federal statutes and 
rules have made inroads into the normally state domain of corporate law.”); CHARLES T. 
O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
141 (5th ed. 2004) (“[F]ederal law may sometimes directly or indirectly preempt state law 
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 Despite its inherent instability as a definitional concept, the 
internal affairs doctrine functions to protect a defined sphere of 
state power, ensuring that lax state corporate laws flourish with 
minimal interference from Congress or the SEC.16  Federalism’s 
most prominent influence on corporate law has been through 
market-based arguments that emphasize the economic benefits said 
to flow from federalism.  Defenders of corporate federalism point to 
myriad economic benefits they claim flow from maintaining a 
decentralized system for devising corporate law to protect the states’ 
regimes from federal intervention.17  Their claims lie at the center of 
the dominant debate in corporate law as to whether competition 
among states for corporate charters has spurred a race to the top or 
a race to the bottom. 
In this familiar debate, race to the bottom theorists assert that 
competition among states for charters has led to the systematic 
dilution of corporate law rules.18  They argue that states compete 
against each other for the fees they charge to corporations chartered 
in their states.19  This competition encourages states to adopt rules 
that favor managers at the expense of shareholders and other 
constituencies.20  In contrast, race to the top theorists argue that 
competitive forces have had a positive effect on corporate law by 
encouraging the adoption of efficient legal rules.21  These theorists 
maintain that competition encourages innovation and 
experimentation which improves the content of corporate law in all 
states.22   
This 30-year debate has reached a stalemate, with neither side 
yielding much ground to the other.  Having approached the debate 
from antithetical policy perspectives, each side advances arguments 
consistent with their pre-formed perspective and simultaneously 
derides opposing arguments.  The debate also tends to disregard the 
effect of the federal constraint on the range of topics with respect to 
which states can compete.23  The overlay of federal regulations 
rules or fill in gaps in the state law structure.”).  See also Roe, supra note 11, at 597-98 
(noting that many scholars view the federal impact on corporate law as “interstitial, weak, 
temporary, and exceptional”). 
16 See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 
29 J. CORP. L. 625, 663 (2004) [hereinafter Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism]. 
 17. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-15 
(1993). 
 18. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 665-66 (1974). 
 19. Id. at 664-66. 
 20. Id. at 665-66. 
 21. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory 
of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 275-76 (1977). 
 22. See id. at 276. 
 23. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1, at ___. 
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limits the extent to which states can achieve optimal rules (in the 
race to the top view) or pander shamelessly to management (in the 
race to the bottom view).24
 
2. The Disclosure/Conduct Distinction 
  
The commitment of courts and commentators to preserve 
internal affairs as an exclusive state domain has generated 
cumbersome efforts to discern a barrier between those issues that 
belong within the federal securities law domain and those that 
should be viewed as internal governance matters.  This has led to 
the creation of an artificial boundary which relies on the 
overgeneralization that securities law is disclosure-based rather 
than conduct-oriented.  Some scholars and judges thus reason that 
regulating the conduct of corporate officers and directors is within 
the states’ sphere, and not a matter governed by the federal 
securities laws. 
By pressing this dichotomy, federalism principles have been 
invoked to constrain the interpretation of the federal securities laws, 
preserving a swath of corporate law terrain for the states.  The 
spurious disclosure/conduct distinction has served as the basis for a 
number of federal court decisions that have invalidated certain SEC 
rules or rejected a broad interpretation of the securities laws as 
inconsistent with the “disclosure” objectives of the statutes. 
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green25 illustrates the courts’ 
frequent insistence on maintaining a bright line between the 
corporate and securities law domains.26  In Santa Fe, the Supreme 
Court closed off an avenue for expanding corporate liability under 
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange 
Act”).27  The Court declined to extend Rule 10b-5 to capture a breach 
of fiduciary duty in a short-form merger.  In rejecting an expansive 
reading of the meaning of “fraud” under Rule 10b-5, the Court 
argued that such a “result would . . . bring within the Rule a wide 
variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation,”28 
and that such an extension of securities law “would overlap and 
 24. Roe, supra note 11, at 591-92 (arguing that the conventional race debate ignores 
the federal government’s influence on state law). 
 25. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 26. Id. at 478-79. 
 27. Id. at 474. For discussions of the federalism implications of Santa Fe, see Bratton 
& McCahery, supra note 1, at ___; Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisal of 
Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial 
Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 451 (2001). 
 28. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478. 
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quite possibly interfere with state corporate law.”29  Finally, the 
Court held that “[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional intent, 
we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of 
corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly 
where established state policies of corporate regulation would be 
overridden.”30
In Business Roundtable v. SEC,31 the D.C. Circuit also relied on 
the disclosure/conduct distinction to invalidate the SEC’s adoption of 
Exchange Act Rule 19c-4.32  Rule 19c-4 required the stock exchanges 
to maintain a one-share/one-vote rule for the common stock of all 
companies listed on the exchanges.33  The Business Roundtable 
court held that the SEC lacked the authority to issue the rule 
because Congress did not intend to grant the agency such broad 
latitude under the Exchange Act.34
The SEC had promulgated the rule under Section 19(c) of the 
Exchange Act, which authorizes the agency to amend stock 
exchange rules, among other reasons, “as [it] deems necessary or 
appropriate . . . in furtherance of the purposes of [the Exchange 
Act].”35  Taken literally, this language is almost a blank check for 
the SEC to impose what it views as proper rules on the exchanges. 
The court, however, found the rule invalid because it “directly 
controls the substantive allocation of powers among classes of 
shareholders.”36  Drawing on the Exchange Act’s legislative history, 
the court reasoned that disclosure had been Congress’s central 
concern when adopting the Exchange Act.37  The SEC’s new rule, 
 29. Id. at 479. 
 30. Id.  The majority in Santa Fe also maintained that the “‘fundamental purpose’ of 
the Act [is] implementing a ‘philosophy of full disclosure’” and that fairness is “at most a 
tangential concern of the statute.” Id. at 478 (citations omitted).  Two concurring justices 
declined to join Part IV of the opinion, which contained these assertions. Justice Stevens 
maintained that the “entire discussion in Part IV is unnecessary to the decision of this case.”  
Id. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). 
 31. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 32. Id. at 411-12. 
 33. For a discussion of the history and the policy considerations underlying the one-
share/one vote rule see Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The 
One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687 (1986). 
 34. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413. 
 35. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) 
(2000). 
 36. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407. 
 37. Id. at 410-11.  A contrary view of the scope of the SEC’s rulemaking authority is 
provided by Joel Seligman:  
Rather than providing the new Commission with a clear mandate, the 
legislators had granted the agency authority to study the controversy or 
issue its own rules.  In effect, Congress had broadly defined the 
Commission’s areas of expertise and invited it to forge its own mandate. 
. . .  [Congress gave] the SEC vague powers to use its discretion in 
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however, went beyond disclosure, and interfered too directly “with 
the substance of what the shareholders may enact.”38
The court did not rely solely on the legislative history to ground 
its decision.  It also asserted that the internal affairs doctrine 
dictated the result.  The court worried that if the SEC’s authority 
were broadly validated, the agency “would be able to establish a 
federal corporate law by using access to national capital markets as 
its enforcement mechanism,”39 and thus “overturn or at least 
impinge severely on the tradition of state regulation of corporate 
law.”40  The court also invoked a classic slippery-slope argument, 
asserting that “[i]f the Commission’s one-share/one-vote rule is to 
survive, then, some kind of firebreak is needed to separate it from 
corporate governance as a whole.”41
Despite its centrality to federal corporate jurisprudence, the 
characterization of the federal securities laws as disclosure-oriented 
is inexact and incomplete.  Such characterization sets aside many 
aspects of the securities laws that directly proscribe conduct.  
Although it is true that disclosure is the primary method relied upon 
under federal law to regulate the securities markets, this historical 
choice has been ascribed unwarranted significance in interpreting 
the securities laws.42
At least since the adoption of Exchange Act in 1934, an 
important objective of federal securities laws has been to regulate 
the conduct of corporate officials.43  Several original provisions of 
the Exchange Act, such as Section 14’s proxy solicitation 
requirements and Section 16’s short-swing trading prohibitions, are 
conduct standards.44  Over the years, Congress has added many 
significant conduct provisions to the statute.   
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 may be the most widely-
discussed instance of explicit federal conduct regulation, yet long 
issuing rules where appropriate ‘in the pubic interest and for the 
protection of investors.’  
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 99-100 (revised ed. 1995). 
 38. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411. 
 39. Id. at 412. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 413.   
 42. See Palmiter, supra note 9, at 477 (“Nothing compelled the Court’s operating 
assumption that the federal securities laws were meant only to regulate corporate 
disclosure.”). 
 43. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 557-58 
(5th ed. 2006) (noting that an important theme of the Exchange Act is to regulate aspects of 
the behavior of issuers and their managers whose stock was traded on the exchanges). 
 44. Exchange Act §§ 14(a), 16(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), 78p(a)-(b) (2000).  See 
also SELIGMAN, supra note 37, at 87 (describing the Exchange Act’s proxy requirements and 
insider trading provisions as the Roosevelt administration’s first efforts to directly regulate 
corporate governance). 
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before the recent scandals Congress was engaged in setting 
corporate governance policy.45  The Williams Act and the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act are examples of prior federal conduct 
regulation.  The Williams Act, adopted in 1968, regulates tender 
offers, restricting the actions of investors seeking to acquire 
corporations through hostile tender offers, as well as the responses 
of the target corporations.46  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act47 
was adopted in 1977 in response to reports of the widespread use of 
corporate slush funds for bribery, illegal campaign contributions and 
other illegitimate purposes.48  It prohibits foreign bribery49 and 
requires publicly traded corporations to maintain standards for 
internal controls over corporate books and records.50  The internal 
control requirements aimed not only to improve the accuracy of 
financial reporting, but also sought to provide investors greater 
assurances regarding the integrity of management.51
Supplementing these statutory requirements, are SEC 
disclosure rules aimed at altering the conduct of corporate officers 
and directors.52  These rules require detailed disclosures regarding 
audit committee composition, executive compensation, conflicts of 
interest, and illegal conduct.53  Congress also regulates corporate 
governance through federal tax provisions aimed at influencing 
practices related to executive compensation, employee pensions, and 
the payment of corporate dividends.54  When the New York Stock 
Exchange’s comprehensive corporate governance standards are 
added to the analysis, the disclosure/conduct distinction becomes 
45.   See Roe, supra note 11, at 598.  Sarbanes Oxley includes numerous mandatory 
provisions covering board and audit committee composition and duties, bans on loans to 
executives, financial certification requirements, and whistle-blower protections, all of which 
go to the heart of corporate internal affairs.  Id. at 633.   
46 Exchange Act §§ 13 (d)-(e) and 14 (d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (d)-(e) (2000 and Supp. III 
2003) and 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d)-(f) (2000). 
47 Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). 
48 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 421 (4th ed. 2002). 
49 Exchange Act § 30A; 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2000). 
50 Exchange Act § 13(b)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. III 2003). 
51 COX, ET AL., supra note 43 at 57. 
52.See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1, at ___, n. __ (“The disclosure mandates 
significantly impact day-to-day conduct of business, despite their formal denomination as 
market regulation.”); O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 15, at 199 (“Sometimes 
disclosure is a thinly disguised effort to change the substance of the behavior by an officer 
or director . . . something that traditionally would be determined by state law.”). 
 53. See SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.400 (2005).   
 54. See Steven A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms, 61 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1159, 1160-61 (2004); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins 
of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 134 (1990) (describing the 1909 Corporate 
Excise Tax as an effort at corporate regulation); James R. Repetti, Corporate Governance 
and Stockholder Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 971, 1017, 1026-27 (1992). 
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even more untenable.55
In sum, the extent of direct conduct regulation under the federal 
securities laws is so significant that the disclosure/conduct 
distinction has little merit as a basis for limiting the expansion of 
federal power in this realm.56  Despite significant departures from 
the disclosure model that began in 1934, the history of federal 
securities regulation has been redescribed by judges and 
commentators in order to constrain the interpretation and 
application of these statutes within the disclosure framework as 
much as possible. 
B. Securities Law—The Federal Sphere 
 
Within the federal government’s acknowledged sphere—
securities law—federalism issues also permeate the policy debate.   
Here the question centers on the division of authority among state 
and federal officials.  Along this dimension, developments run 
counter to what notions of federalism would seem to support.  The 
tradition of respect for state authority in securities regulation has 
significantly eroded, as Congress has acted to limit the states’ 
authority to enforce their own laws.  Unlike corporate law, where 
the virtues of federalism are front and center, when it comes to 
determining the proper allocation of authority between federal and 
state authorities in securities law, federalism’s supposed advantages 
tend to be disregarded or dismissed.57
Although most power over the securities markets is exercised by 
federal authorities, Congress reserved for the states concurrent 
power to regulate securities transactions.58  Thus, an important 
issue in securities law concerns the division of authority between 
state officials and federal authorities.  The conventionally accepted 
division of authority relegates to the states the exercise of local 
administrative and enforcement duties, leaving to Congress and the 
SEC the task of establishing a national policy for the securities 
 55. Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, 
State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 963 (2003); NYSE 
Corporate Governance Rules, available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf 
(last visited June 8, 2006). 
 56. See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure 
Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 139, 201-03 (2006). 
 57. Portions of this discussion are adapted from Jones, Dynamic Federalism, supra 
note 4, at 110-16. 
 58. The Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter Securities Act] and the Exchange Act both 
contained savings clauses, preserving the continued viability of state securities statutes.  See 
Securities Act § 18(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (2000); Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 
78bb(a) (2000). 
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markets.59  Actions by state officials that challenge this informal 
division of power invariably trigger calls for federal preemption from 
corporate quarters. 
When it adopted the federal securities laws, Congress opted for 
a uniform system of national regulation to supplement existing state 
laws.60  This dual-regulatory structure recognized that the states’ 
continued involvement in securities regulation was necessary to 
provide remedies beyond those which the new federal statutes 
created.61  Over time, this structure has been forcefully criticized.  
Corporations complained that the system was duplicative and 
wasteful because it required companies to contend with the costs 
and inconvenience of complying with federal securities laws as well 
the laws of every state in which their securities traded.62  Beginning 
in the 1990s this dual regulatory structure was subject to a full-
scale legislative assault.63
 
1. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 
 
 Criticism of state blue sky laws led first to efforts to coordinate 
federal and state exemptions from the securities laws’ registration 
requirements.64  The objective was to ensure that if a securities 
offering satisfied the exemption requirements of one state, it would 
also qualify for similar exemptions available from other states and 
the SEC.65  When these coordination efforts failed, the securities 
industry pushed for the adoption of the National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 (the “NSMIA”).66  NSMIA prohibits states 
from enforcing their registration requirements for offerings of “listed 
 59. Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2365 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, Empowering Investors] 
(asserting that “states have essentially abandoned the regulation of public firms to the 
SEC”). 
 60. See supra note 58. 
 61. Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case 
Against Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495, 515-25 (1984).  See also Manning Gilbert Warren 
III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case for Reallocation of Regulatory 
Responsibilities, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 504 (2000). 
 62. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-864, at 39 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920. 
 63. See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Insidious Remnants of State Rules 
Respecting Capital Formation, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 407, 411-13 (2000). 
 64. See Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 § 505, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 
94 Stat. 2275, 2292-93 (1980) (adding Section 19(c) to the Securities Act); Roberta S. 
Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United 
States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 507-08 (2003). 
 65. See Campbell, supra note 63, at 412. 
 66. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
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securities” and most private placements.67
 
2. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
 
 In 1998, Congress acted again to limit the states’ authority in 
securities regulation.  This time preemption advocates argued that 
securities suits filed in California were undermining the strict 
procedural rules mandated by the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (the “PSLRA”).68  They therefore lobbied for federal 
preemption of securities fraud actions brought in state court.69  In 
response to these complaints, Congress adopted the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act (the “SLUSA”), which preempts 
most securities class actions based on state law, authorizing their 
removal to federal court.70
The prospect of federal preemption of state securities laws 
appealed to its proponents only because of a complementary trend 
that had developed in the federal courts and in Congress.  This so-
called retrenchment trend began in the 1970s and has been marked 
by a series of Supreme Court decisions that narrowed the remedies 
 67. Securities Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2000).  NSMIA prohibits states from 
enforcing registration or qualification requirements for any “covered security.”  NSMIA’s 
definition of “covered security” includes any securities listed, or to be listed, on a national 
stock exchange or the Nasdaq National Market and all securities sold under Securities Act 
Rule 506, the SEC’s private placement safe harbor.  Id. § 77r(b)(1), (4). 
 68. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.).  Among other reforms, the PSLRA created new lead plaintiff provisions for 
securities class actions, imposed heightened pleading standards for securities fraud claims, 
codified the “bespeaks caution” doctrine to immunize companies from liability for false 
projections, and imposed a mandatory stay on discovery pending a defendant’s motion to 
dismiss.  See DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 395-402 
(2003).  Some commentators have challenged the empirical basis for the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act (the “SLUSA”) proponents’ claims that state law suits 
were undermining the PSLRA. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor 
Protection: Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies for Securities Fraud, 
60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 178 (1997).  
 69. The high-tech industry in Silicon Valley and the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants were the leading proponents of the both the PSLRA and SLUSA.  See 
David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 
1998: The Sun Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (1998); Michael A. 
Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 288 n.70 (1998); Painter, supra note 6, at 4-6. 
 70. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as Securities Act §16(b), 15 
U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2000) and Exchange Act § 28(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2000)).  SLUSA 
prohibits the litigation of any “covered class action based upon the statutory or common law 
of any State” for fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.  The 
act defines a “covered class action” as a law suit seeking damages on behalf of fifty or more 
plaintiffs.  A “covered security” is defined as a security that is listed or authorized for listing 
on a national stock exchange and any other security of the same issuer of equal or higher 
seniority.  Securities Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b), 77p(f)(2) (2000); Exchange Act § 
28(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(C) (2000).  See Levine & Pritchard, supra note 69, at 2-3. 
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available to investors under the federal securities laws.71  In 1995, 
Congress adopted the PSLRA, which codified many of the Court’s 
defendant-friendly doctrines and created additional barriers to 
plaintiffs pursuing securities fraud claims.72
 
3. The States’ Ascendancy 
 
 The preemption efforts discussed above focused on limiting 
state authority over securities registration and the private civil 
litigation of securities fraud claims.  The statutes preserved states’ 
power to enforce their securities laws through civil and criminal 
actions initiated by state officials.73 At the time, preserving the 
states’ enforcement powers was uncontroversial, because state and 
federal regulators had informally divided enforcement duties in a 
manner that appealed to business interests.  State regulators 
focused their enforcement efforts on pursuing small-time fraud 
actions against individuals and local firms (boiler rooms, Ponzi 
schemes, and the like) and left the SEC to pursue cases of national 
importance involving large established companies.74
Early in this century, this informal equilibrium faltered when 
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer began to investigate 
questionable industry practices that had taken root on Wall 
Street.75  These efforts began with Mr. Spitzer’s high-profile probe of 
analyst conflicts on Wall Street.  In 2001, Mr. Spitzer’s office opened 
an investigation into Merrill Lynch’s analyst recommendations.  
This investigation revealed that Merrill Lynch’s analysts did not 
always believe the advice they gave investors, confirming suspicions 
that such recommendations were tainted by concerns with 
maintaining lucrative investment banking relationships.76  Merrill 
Lynch settled the matter by paying $100 million in fines and 
agreeing to separate its research and investment banking 
functions.77  After the Merrill Lynch settlement, Mr. Spitzer joined 
forces with the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange, the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, and other state regulators.  
 71. See Levine & Pritchard, supra note 69, at 5 & n. 23.   
 72. See Warren, supra note 68, at 170-74. 
 73. Securities Act § 18(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (2000).  See also Warren, supra note 
71, at 176. 
 74. See Perino, supra note 69, at 279 (describing state regulators as “local cop[s] on 
the beat” with a traditional “consumer protection” role). 
 75. See John Cassidy, The Investigation; How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, NEW 
YORKER, Apr. 7, 2003, at 54.  See also ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 74-81 (2002) 
(describing the SEC’s inability to effectively address analyst conflicts). 
 76. Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch Will Negotiate with Spitzer, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
15, 2002, at C1. 
 77. See Cassidy, supra note 75, at 53. 
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Working together, the agencies conducted a comprehensive 
investigation of analyst fraud at other Wall Street firms.  The 
expanded investigation revealed similar conflicts at other firms and 
led to the $1.4 billion “global settlement” among ten Wall Street 
firms, the SEC, the self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”), and all 
fifty states.78
The states’ aggressive enforcement posture provoked an outcry 
from the industries targeted by their investigations. Business 
groups initiated efforts to expand federal preemption to preclude 
states from enforcing laws that conflicted with SEC or SRO 
standards.79  A number of federal officials, including the SEC’s 
chairman and its enforcement chief, supported these preemption 
efforts.80  In Congress, Representatives Michael Oxley and Richard 
Baker led a failed legislative bid to strip state securities regulators 
of their enforcement powers.81  Although these efforts to restrict the 
 78. See Gretchen Morgenson & Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Firms are Ready to 
Pay $1 Billion in Fines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at A1.  Mr. Spitzer and regulators from 
other states also led investigations of market-timing and late trading at mutual funds.  As 
one example, Massachusetts Secretary of State William Galvin led the investigation into 
market-timing practices at Putnam Investments, uncovering serious market-timing 
violations by senior Putnam employees.  See Andrew Caffrey, State, SEC Hit Putnam, 2 
Managers Personal Profit Tied to Excessive Rapid Trading, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 29, 2003, 
at A1; (ILL)Jeffrey Krasner & Andrew Caffrey, SEC Missed a Chance in its Probe of 
Putnam, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 2003, at A1.; (ILL)Beth Healy, Putnam Agrees to $110 
Million Settlement; Trading Penalty is 10 Times More than Investor Restitution, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Apr. 9, 2004, at D1. 
 79. See, e.g., Press Release, Securities Industry Association, SIA Welcomes NY AG’s 
Support for National Standards for Capital Markets (June 26,  
2002) (on file with author); see also Kathleen Day, Brokerage Settlement Leaves Much 
Unresolved: SEC Acknowledges Need for New, Specific Rules, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2003, 
at E1; Gretchen Morgenson, State Regulators Win Some, Lose Some, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 
2004, § 3, at 8. 
 80. See Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Remarks at the F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law 
Symposium, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 545, 552-53 (2003) (“Congress clearly intended, when it 
adopted NSMIA, that the federal government, not the states, establish the rules and policies 
governing the securities markets, and that it do so on a national, rather than piecemeal, 
basis.” (emphasis in original);  Hearing on Nomination of William H. Donaldson Before the 
Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 25 (2003) (Statement of 
William H. Donaldson) (“I think that one of the great strengths of our market system is that 
it is a national market system and has not been [B]alkanized.”).  Judith Burns, SEC Warns of 
Uncoordinated Inquiries, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2003, at C14 quoting Chairman Donaldson 
as stating, “state law enforcement officials are jumping on securities cases for political gain 
and may compromise federal investigations in the process.”)   
 81. Letter from Representative Michael G. Oxley to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 
2002, § 3, at 11 (“[S]etting policy for our national capital markets is properly the duty and 
responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the self-regulatory 
organizations.”).  Congressman Baker introduced a provision that would have prevented 
states from enforcing any state requirements against brokers and dealers that differed from 
rules established by the SEC or the stock exchanges.  STAFF OF H.R. SUBCOMM. ON CAPITAL 
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states’ enforcement powers did not succeed, they show how readily 
federalism’s positive values can be discounted when they conflict 
with other political interests. 
 To summarize, unlike corporate law where federalism 
arguments support state sovereignty, the recent trend in securities 
law has been to limit state power.  With legislation such as NSMIA 
and SLUSA, Congress overturned a 70-year tradition of federal 
deference to state authority in the securities arena.  Federalism’s 
values of competition, responsiveness, and innovation were rarely 
mentioned in policy debates and, when pondered, were often deemed 
outweighed by the need for uniformity.82
II.  CORPORATE FEDERALISM  IN PERSPECTIVE  
A. Federalism’s Dissonant Application Across Corporate 
Governance Fields 
 
Considerable dissonance exists between the central role that 
federalism has played in the corporate law debate and the ease with 
which its vaunted attributes are rejected in securities law 
discussions.83  The very attributes of decentralization that defenders 
of corporate federalism celebrate (diversity, experimentation, and 
competition) are decried by those who advocate for a single central 
authority to regulate the national securities markets.84  Although 
some scholars have proposed duplicating the corporate federalist 
structure in securities regulation by allowing issuers to “opt out” of 
federal securities regulation, a chorus of academic commentary has 
supported calls for uniformity via the expansion of federal 
regulatory hegemony in securities regulation.85
MKTS., INS., & GOV’T SPONSORED ENTERS., 108TH CONG., FAIR ACT AMENDMENTS 24-25 
(Comm. Print 2003).  He withdrew his proposed amendment after sustained negative 
commentary from defenders of the states’ enforcement efforts.  “Anti-Spitzer” Provision to 
be Removed from Bill, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 2004, § 3, at 3. 
 82. See, e.g., Perino, supra note 69, at 278 (“[N]one of the traditional justifications for 
allocating authority to the states applies to the regulation of private causes of action against 
issuers whose securities trade on national markets.”).  But see Stephen J. Choi, Promoting 
Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 815, 856-57 (2001) (arguing that 
securities law would benefit from choice and innovation brought about by regulatory 
competition, rather than uniform federal law); Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 
59, at 2392-95, 2631 (advocating a market-oriented approach of competitive federalism that 
would expand the role of states in securities regulation).  
 83. Ahdieh, supra note 6, at 735 (“Taken to their logical[,] and relatively proximate, 
conclusion, federalism arguments . . . favor the shift of both corporate and securities 
regulation to the states.”). 
 84. See Painter, supra note 6, at 13-14. 
 85. Compare Choi, supra note 82, at 857 and Romano, Empowering Investors, supra 
note 59, at 2401 (supporting issuer choice in securities regulation) with Campbell, supra 
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The apparent discrepancy between the prominence of 
federalism arguments in corporate law and their curious omission 
from discussions in securities law policy is puzzling.  Why should a 
set of values so central to corporate law discussions be set aside in 
the literature of the inexorably connected field of securities law? 
One possible explanation is the limiting effects of cognitive 
habits of categorization.  Academics tend to specialize in their 
research and writing, choosing to focus their intellectual energy in 
one field or another.  Due to such specialization, important insights 
in one field do not automatically migrate to other fields where they 
might be useful and relevant.  While this is true, it is important to 
note that many professors of corporate law also teach securities 
regulation, and many of these professors write frequently in both 
fields.  Habits of categorization can certainly constrain one’s 
thinking, closing off certain thought patterns when discussing 
different areas of law.  However, the substantial overlap and 
interplay between corporate and securities law suggests that 
categorization provides only a partial explanation of the discrepancy 
noted. 
Another way to reconcile this discrepancy is to view appeals to 
federalism as a rhetorical tactic in a more generalized effort to limit 
regulation of any kind.  It is well-recognized that many advocates of 
federalism are generally opposed to the expansion of federal 
administrative power.86  More generally, and less widely 
acknowledged, federalism proponents favor minimizing the 
intrusion of government at any level in the private ordering of 
economic affairs.87   
This added nuance helps explain the apparent inconsistency in 
the strong support that exists for decentralization of corporate law 
rules with the quiet acceptance of federal preemption of state 
securities provisions.  The salient difference lies not in the 
theoretical possibilities of reaping benefits from experimenting with 
note 63, at 411-13 and Perino, supra note 69, at 338 (supporting preemption of state 
securities laws).  See also Karmel, supra note 64, at 546 (arguing that “[s]ince the problems 
are national, and in some respects international in scope, an effective national regulator 
seems more appropriate than piecemeal state regulation.”);  Steve A. Radom, Note, 
Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case for Federal Preemption, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 
295 (2003) (arguing that preemption may be necessary to prevent a “Balkanized” system of 
securities regulation). 
 86. See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable 
Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 892 (1999); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: 
Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 641 (2001); Edward L. Rubin & 
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 
931 (1994). 
 87. Ahdieh, supra note 6, at 740 (“[I]t is not federal law to which critics of the 
[Sarbanes-Oxley] Act’s “federalization” object; it is law—or at least law in a command-and-
control, regulatory sense.”). 
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varied substantive standards in these legal regimes, but rather in 
the identity of the party empowered to choose among competing 
regimes.  In corporate law, managers choose the state of 
incorporation and thus have the power to select those laws which 
will govern their behavior.88  In securities regulation, the party 
seeking to enforce the law (whether a private plaintiff or a 
government official) chooses whether to assert a claim under a given 
regulatory regime.89
There are several reasons that opponents of regulation might  
choose to couch their arguments in federalism terms.90  As 
Professors Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley colorfully explain, 
“[federalism] conjures up images of Fourth of July parades down 
Main Street, drugstore soda fountains, and family farms with tire 
swings in the front yard.”91  By appealing to history, tradition, and 
the founders’ intent, advocates can help forestall a normative 
critique of the status quo.  Another advantage to opposing 
regulation through appeals to federalism is that such arguments 
appear neutral as to the substance of the regulation.92 This 
seemingly detached position allows its proponents to obscure the 
true nature of their objection while still thwarting the 
implementation of policies which they oppose.93 After all, the 
interlocutor is challenging the authority of the actor rather than the 
wisdom or desirability of the proposed regulatory action.   
As professors Rubin and Feeley observe, “[t]his is perfectly good 
 88. Robert A. Prentice, Regulatory Competition in Securities Law: A Dream (That 
Should be) Deferred, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1158 (2005). 
 89. See, e.g., Securities Act §§ 11-12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l (2000). 
 90. DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 37 (1995). 
 91. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 86, at 906.  Note, however, that even prominent 
proponents of federalism seem quick to abandon it when its implications are inconvenient to 
their policy objectives.  For recent examples, consider Republican support for a 
constitutional ban on gay marriage and the Terry Schiavo bill.  See also Jonathan R. Macey, 
Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a 
Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 265 (1990).  Macey states: 
Conservatives and liberals alike extol the virtues of state autonomy whenever 
deference to the states happens to serve their political needs at a particular 
moment.  Yet both groups are also quick to wield the power of the supremacy 
clause, while citing vague platitudes about the need for uniformity among the 
states, whenever a single national rule in a particular area furthers their political 
interests. 
Id.  
 92. See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(“Neither the wisdom of the requirement, nor of its being imposed at the federal level, is 
here in question.”). 
 93. Put another way, the “[p]reference for a vague critique of ‘federalization’ over a 
broad condemnation of regulation is hardly surprising . . . given the likely greater resonance 
of an implied defense of doctrinal consistency and coherence.”  Ahdieh, supra note 6, at 
740. 
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political strategy, but it is hardly a convincing argument for 
federalism.”94  Deregulatory arguments disguised as federalism 
provide little aid in situating regulatory authority with the proper 
level of government.  After all, the goal of many such federalists is 
not properly situated regulation, but no regulation at all.  Once we 
recognize that many appeals to federalism are merely rhetorical 
tactics within a broader political strategy for promoting 
deregulation, we can more appropriately evaluate the arguments 
federalists advance in the corporate sphere.   
B. New Federalism - The “Sphere” Perspective 
Federalism arguments in corporate law suffer from the same 
shortcomings as parallel arguments advanced in the constitutional 
context.  Thus, a brief review of how the sphere of influence 
perspective has influenced constitutional law theory should lead to a 
better understanding of federalism’s role in corporate law debates. 
The sphere of influence mentality that dominates corporate law 
theory is reflected in broader constitutional scholarship.95  The view 
is best exemplified by the Supreme Court’s New Federalism 
jurisprudence, under which the Court has invalidated a number of 
federal statutes on the grounds that they run afoul of constitutional 
limits on Congressional power.96  Decisions such as United States v. 
Lopez97 and United States v. Morrison98 reignited a debate among 
constitutional law scholars over the proper role of the courts in 
defining the boundaries of Congressional authority.99   
 94. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 86, at 935. 
 95. See Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In 
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 830 (1995); Marci A. Hamilton, 
Why Federalism Must be Enforced: A Response to Professor Kramer, 46 VILL. L. REV. 
1069, 1085 (2001); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 163 (2004). 
 96. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (striking down aspects of 
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 
(1995) (ruling the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 unconstitutional); N.Y. v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 180 (1992) (parenthetical?).  For an overview of New Federalism 
jurisprudence, see Brown, supra note 8, at 1011-12. 
 97. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 98. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
99  In Lopez, the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zone Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) 
(Supp. V 1988), on the grounds that it was too tangentially related to commerce to come 
within Congress’s commerce powers.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.  The Act made it a federal 
offense “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual 
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” id. § 922(q)(2)(A).  In 
Morrison, the Court ruled that the civil remedy provisions of the Violence Against Women 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000), were unconstitutional and thus unenforceable. Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 617-18.  The court reasoned that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, 
in any sense of the phrase, economic activity,” and thus not subject to federal regulation 
under the commerce clause.  Id. at 613. 
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Although it has its strong proponents, New Federalism has been 
forcefully criticized over the years.  Detractors argue that many of 
the benefits claimed for federalism are illusory.100  For example, 
Professors Rubin and Feeley argue that many purported features of 
federalism, such as increased citizen participation and improved 
responsiveness of government, derive from the historical 
preservation of autonomy for local governments—counties, cities, 
and towns – rather than states.101  The historic autonomy of 
localities is wholly unrelated to, and may even be threatened by, 
state autonomy that federalists champion.102  The authors thus 
conclude that federalism, as conceived and advanced by its 
proponents, is “a neurosis, a dysfunctional belief to which we cling 
despite its irrelevance to present circumstances.”103
Professor David Shapiro has also questioned many of 
federalism’s central claims.  He points out that most economic 
federalism arguments hinge on a contestable value judgment that 
free markets are preferable to government regulation.104  Such 
arguments also fail to account adequately for barriers to mobility, 
externalities, and transaction costs, which interfere with the 
realization of federalism’s efficiency claims.105  Professor Shapiro 
also challenges the common claim that federalism helps to protect 
individuals against tyranny.  As Professor Shapiro notes, the 
national government frequently has led the way in protecting 
individual liberties, often against tyranny and oppression 
threatened by states.106
Other scholars concede the value of state autonomy, yet object 
to the Court’s efforts to enforce federalism’s boundaries.  Professor 
100 See generally Rubin & Feeley, supra note 83; SHAPIRO, supra note 87; Larry Kramer, 
Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994).   
 101. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 86, at 919-20. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 950; see also Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of 
America, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 49 (2001). 
 104. SHAPIRO, supra note 90, at 37. 
 105. Id. at 37-44. 
    106.  Id. at 52-56 (noting the cases of slavery, Jim Crow, and criminal procedure).  
Despite his skepticism toward some federalism claims, Professor Shapiro notes the 
importance of the historical role states play in our political structure and urges maintaining 
this traditional respect for state authority.  Id. at 122-23.  Although he rejects federalism as a 
constraint on national authority he does not believe that Congress should replace state law 
with federal law to the full extent of its enumerated powers.  Rather, he argues that state 
power should be displaced only upon strong arguments by advocates for national action.  Id. 
at 118-20.  In a conclusion that points toward a dynamic conception of federalism, he states 
that “the true genius of American federalism lies in the continuing, and constitutionally 
assured, basis for dialogue—for moral, political, economic, and social debate over the 
merits of the allocation of power . . . among the various branches of government.”  Id. at 
140. 
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Larry Kramer insists that our political structure protects the states’ 
authority in those areas of law that matter most to citizens in their 
everyday life.107  He concludes that because a combination of 
structural, administrative, cultural, and political forces protect state 
authority, the Court should not seek to enforce federalism.108
 
C.  The Interactive Perspective 
  
 Weaknesses in the sphere of influence perspective have led 
scholars to develop alternative conceptions of the federal-state 
relationship.  These alternative theories provide a contrasting 
perspective on how best to manage the frequent overlap of federal 
and state power.  In advancing the concept of dynamic federalism, I 
have argued that competition, cooperation, and coordination among 
state and federal regulators are by-products of a system of 
concurrent authority that accrues to the public benefit.109  Just as 
separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches protects against perilous concentrations of power, the 
interaction between federal and state regulators provides built-in 
checks against abuse of power and expands opportunities for public 
participation in government. 
This emerging view avoids the “New Federalism” debate over 
how to allocate authority over various issues, and whether such 
determinations should be made by courts or through the political 
process.  Instead, it views concurrent and overlapping state and 
federal authority as the norm, not a peculiarity to be resolved.  Its 
proponents argue that rather than resisting this reality, scholars 
should focus on better understanding the relationship between state 
and federal power, and facilitating cooperation and coordination 
among different levels of government.110   
A recent article by Professor Robert Schapiro provides a 
comprehensive account of this interactive approach to federalism 
problems.111  In his article, Professor Schapiro asserts that “[t]he 
key to understanding the promise of federalism lies in considering 
state and national power not in isolation but in interconnection.”112  
 107. Kramer, supra note 100, at 1521-24.  According to Kramer, the national political 
parties’ influence on local, state, and national elections helps ensure that national leaders 
cooperate with and respect the autonomy of state and local politicians. Id. at 1542. 
108 Id. at 1560-61 
109 See Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism, supra note 16, at 636-39; Jones, Dynamic 
Federalism, supra note 16, at 109-10. 
110 In Part III of this Article, I present an integrated model of corporate regulation to help 
facilitate such discussions.  See infra text accompanying notes xx- xx. 
111 Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 
285 (2005). 
 112. Id. at 248. 
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He argues that the interaction of state and federal power should be 
neither prevented nor discouraged.  Courts and legislators should 
instead embrace such interaction as a mechanism that often 
facilitates the emergence of effective policy solutions.113
Interactive federalism gives the public the advantage of 
examining and benefiting from multiple approaches to solving a 
particular problem.114  Maintaining concurrent authority also 
provides an opportunity for dialogue, allowing each level of 
government to learn from the other.115  Furthermore, state and 
federal governments can provide alternative forms of relief.  This 
regulatory redundancy serves as a “fail-safe mechanism,” an 
additional source of protection if one or the other level of 
government fails to provide adequate safeguards to the public.116   
Professor Schapiro’s work synthesizes the ideas of other 
scholars who have argued for a similar approach.  These scholars 
draw insights from the history of interaction between federal and 
state regulators in various fields and urge a greater appreciation of 
the beneficial aspects of sustained inter-governmental interaction.  
For example, Professor Judith Resnik challenges the merits of the 
federalism arguments behind the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Morrison,117 invalidating the civil remedy provision 
of the federal Violence Against Women Act.118  In that decision, the 
Court held that matters related to family law and crime were 
properly within the states’ sphere and thus outside the reach of 
Congress’s commerce powers.119  In criticizing the Court’s analysis, 
Professor Resnik calls for an approach she terms “multi-faceted 
federalism,” advancing the idea that “many categories are 
intertwined in law-making enterprises and that more than one 
source of legal regulation is likely to apply to any set of 
behaviors.”120  She argues that the categorical approach exemplified 
by New Federalism misses the “dynamic interaction across levels of 
governance.”121  She views federalism instead as “a web of 
connections formed by transborder responses . . . and through 
shared efforts by national organizations of state officials, localities 
 113. Id. at 285-86. 
 114. Id. at 288. 
 115. Id. at 288-89; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 90, at 140. 
 116. Schapiro, supra note 111, at 289-90.  See also Jones, Rethinking Corporate 
Federalism, supra note 16, at 639 (noting that the state regulatory regime serves as a “safety 
valve”). 
 117. 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). 
 118. Resnik, supra note 86, at 629-34. 
 119. Id. at 619. 
 120. Id. at 622.  Under Professor Resnik’s concept, “[o]ne level of government may 
preside over a given set of problems for a given period rather than forever.”  Id. at 623. 
 121. Id. at 624. 
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and private interests.”122  She points out, for example, the many 
aspects of federal and state law that affect the structure of family 
life and the personal safety and security of women.123
Similarly, Professors Robert Cover and Alexander Aleinikoff 
have described a process they call “dialectical federalism” to explain 
how federal and state courts communicate and interact through 
habeas corpus proceedings and criminal jurisprudence to develop 
policies and procedures for protecting individual rights in the 
criminal justice system.124  Examples of important federal-state 
interaction also abound in criminal, environmental, and health and 
safety law.125  The extension of federal involvement in areas 
traditionally understood as the states’ domain is likely to continue, 
making it even more important that we understand better how to 
harness the benefits and minimize the burdens of maintaining 
concurrent authority in so many areas of law. 
III. AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE REGULATION 
 
The interactive perspective on the federal-state relationship 
offers a promising approach for analyzing corporate governance 
problems.  It suggests the need for a flexible and comprehensive 
view of corporate regulation—an approach unbounded by strictures 
imposed by federalism’s imagined boundaries.  Instead of hewing to 
the outmoded and unwieldy sphere of influence approach, we should 
view corporate and securities law as an integrated whole.  Corporate 
and securities laws all aim to mitigate agency problems by curbing 
corporate managers’ temptations toward negligence, self-dealing, 
and fraud.126  Given these shared policy objectives, it is 
unsurprising that the matters addressed under each regime would 
overlap and converge.127
The integrated approach advanced here draws on the 
developments in constitutional law in which scholars have 
challenged the re-emergent quest for protected spheres of state 
authority.128  It reflects the fluidity of interaction between federal 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 654-56. 
 124. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas 
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1046-47 (1977). 
125 Jones, Dynamic Federalism, supra note 4, at 130. 
 126. Prentice, supra note 88, at 1158. 
 127. See Jennifer O’Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship 
Between the Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal 
Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 475, 476-77, 525-26 (2002) (describing the substantial 
overlap in subject matter under Rule 10b-5 fraud liability and state corporate law’s fiduciary 
duty of candor). 
 128. See supra text accompanying notes 106-114. 
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and state actors in corporate regulation over the past seventy years, 
and allows for continuing interaction between state and federal law 
which should increase the likelihood that effective policies will be 
adopted.   
Sustained interaction between state and federal regulators 
improves the likelihood that government policies will reflect the 
public will and that such policies can be implemented effectively.  
Additionally, such sustained interaction helps facilitate democratic 
deliberation by accommodating more (and more varied) voices, 
creating tension that can spur political debate, and preserving 
multiple avenues of public appeal. 
A.   The Basic Outline 
 
The integrated approach to corporate governance is not a reform 
proposal.  Rather, it is a call to recognize the interactive system that 
actually exists.  Under an integrated approach, Congress and state 
governments would all maintain their roles in shaping corporate 
governance policy.  Most importantly, Congress would remain fully 
engaged and informed on issues in corporate governance, so that it 
is poised to act when necessary to address shortcomings in the 
existing legal regime.  An integrated approach also suggests that the 
SEC should be afforded a wide berth for administrative action.  Its 
administrative authority should be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the broad language employed in the Exchange 
Act.129
Recognizing the SEC’s authority to implement corporate 
governance reforms offers several advantages over a narrow 
construction of SEC authority.  When compared to legislative action 
by Congress, SEC rulemaking can be a more flexible and nimble 
regulatory tool.  SEC regulations can be amended and fine-tuned in 
response to new developments or economic crises.  For example, the 
SEC responded in real-time to concerns arising from the Enron 
fraud and financial misconduct at other corporations.  Months 
before Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms, the SEC 
had begun to address investor confidence issues created by the 
 129. See, e.g., Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2000) (authorizing the SEC to 
adopt proxy solicitation rules “as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors”); § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000 
and Supp. III 2003) (authorizing the SEC to adopt such anti-fraud rules “as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors”); § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000) (discussed supra note 33, stating that the 
SEC may “abrogate, add to, and delete from . . . the rules of a self-regulatory organization . . 
. as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate . . . in furtherance of the purposes of 
[the Act]”). 
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accounting scandals.130  When it enacted Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress 
codified many of the SEC’s post-Enron regulations, implicitly 
approving the SEC’s initial response.131
Another advantage to SEC rulemaking is that a miscalculation 
or error in an SEC rule or policy is easier to correct than a similar 
misstep embodied in a federal statute.  Congress is slow to revisit 
legislation, especially when the concerns that prompted the 
legislation have moved off the regulatory agenda.132  Major 
corporate reform legislation occurs only upon the confluence of a 
combination of political, economic and social circumstances.133  
Given the rarity of political alignments conducive to national 
corporate governance legislation, it makes sense to authorize 
administrative agencies to respond to intermittent policy problems 
and crises.134  
The current controversy regarding the costs and benefits of 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s internal control reporting requirements illustrates 
why delegated rulemaking is sometimes preferable to fixed 
legislative mandates.  Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires 
reporting companies to assess annually the effectiveness of their 
internal controls and requires the firms’ auditors to attest to the 
accuracy of managements’ reports.135  Many corporations have 
 130. In January 2002, the SEC issued interpretive releases on off-balance sheet 
financing and management’s discussion and analysis to guide corporations and their 
accountants toward more transparent disclosures.  See Commission Statement about 
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, 
No. 33-8056 67 Fed. Reg. 3746-02 (2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-
8056.htm.  Similarly, after the exposure of the World-Com fraud in June 2002, the SEC 
issued an emergency order requiring senior executives at all large public corporations to 
certify to the accuracy and reliability of their companies’ most recent financial statements.  
Order Requiring the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to Section 21(a)(1) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, File No. 4-460 (June 27, 2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/4-460.htm.  The SEC also proposed new rules requiring 
senior executives to certify to the accuracy of all of their quarterly and annual reports, and to 
undertake reasonable measures to assure the adequacy of their companies’ internal controls.  
Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-46079, 67 Fed. Reg. 41877 (proposed June 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-46079.htm. 
 131. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light 
Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 918 (2003).  The existence of 
these and other SEC initiatives is one reason that some argue that Sarbanes-Oxley was 
mostly window dressing.  Id. at 941-43. 
 132. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1600-02 (2005) [hereinafter, Romano, Quack Corporate 
Governance] (recommending sunset provisions for emergency legislation). 
133 Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1, at ___. 
134 See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make 
Political Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON & ORG. 81 (1985) (supporting broad delegation of 
administrative authority).   
 135. 15 U.S.C. § 7262. See Rachel McTague, SEC Advisory Panel Votes on Final 
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complained about the high costs of § 404 compliance, especially for 
smaller companies.136  In response to these complaints, an SEC 
Advisory Committee issued a controversial recommendation that the 
SEC exempt small public companies from some or all of § 404’s 
requirements.137  The SEC rejected the Committee’s 
recommendation, and instead delayed further the § 404 compliance 
deadline for smaller companies. 
Had Congress delegated the task of specifying the scope and 
breadth of internal control reporting requirements to the SEC, the 
SEC could have better balanced the interests in greater financial 
transparency and accuracy against the proportionately higher costs 
of internal control assessments and audits for smaller companies.  
The SEC’s notice  comment procedures and its required cost-benefit 
analyses provide safeguards not required as part of the legislative 
process.138  Although the SEC may be able to soften the impact of § 
404 through its exemptive authority, its discretion is limited by the 
requirements of the statute.139
The SEC’s rulemaking procedures also protect important 
democratic values.140  Under the Administrative Procedure Act, its 
regulatory proposals are subject to extensive public comment.141  
The comment process assures an opportunity for interested parties 
to debate and criticize proposed regulations.  The rulemaking 
process also allows ordinary citizens and a wide range of interest 
groups to voice their concerns to the SEC.142
Report; Section 404 Relief Advised, With Dissents, 21 CORP. COUNS. WKLY. 129, 129 
(2006). 
 136. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 06-361, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE 
ON SMALL BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, U.S. SENATE, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: 
CONSIDERATION OF KEY PRINCIPLES NEEDED IN ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMALLER 
PUBLIC COMPANIES 4-5 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06361.pdf. 
 137. McTague, supra note 135, at 129. 
 138. See infra text accompanying notes 137-39. 
 139. Some advocates maintain that the SEC lacks exemptive authority to adopt the 
Advisory Committee’s recommendations.  See Rachel McTague, AARP Urges SEC, 
PCAOB To Reject Broad Exemption, 21 CORP. COUNS. WKLY. 109, 109 (2006).  Consider 
also that Congress failed to reconsider the PSLRA despite strong criticism of the heightened 
pleading standards and discovery stay, and charges that its limitations on shareholder 
litigation played a role in the rampant financial reporting abuses by corporate managers. 
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History 
of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 288-91 (2004); Cunningham, supra note 131, at 921-
22. 
 140. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for 
Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 275 (2005) 
(describing the SEC’s deliberative rulemaking process). 
 141. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 and other 
scattered sections of Title 5). 
 142. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 411, 429 (2005) (discussing the influence of public comments on rulemaking by 
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Although protective of a robust federal role in corporate 
governance, an integrated perspective on corporate governance also 
cautions against ready preemption of state law.  Due to our political 
history, states have developed an extensive system of statutory and 
common law.  As long as state laws do not conflict with the national 
interest, such laws should be respected.  Federal preemption may be 
warranted when there is a clear need for policy coordination that 
cannot be achieved through uniform laws.143  However, when 
undertaken, such preemption should be limited in scope.   
Under such analysis, legislation such as NSMIA can be 
justified.  The states tried and failed to coordinate exemptions from 
securities registration requirements with the SEC.144  Strong 
arguments were advanced for the need for uniformity for nationwide 
securities offerings.145  In contrast, the arguments for preemption of 
state securities fraud claims are less persuasive.  Uniform standards 
exist at the state and federal levels prohibiting fraud in securities 
transactions.  The federal courts have construed the elements of a 
Rule 10b-5 to accord with state common law fraud standards.  
Moreover, forty states have adopted some version of the Uniform 
Securities Act which include a anti-fraud provisions patterned on 
federal law.146  Variations that do exist among states and between 
state and federal officials relate mainly to enforcement practices and 
procedures.  Thus, although corporations and stock promoters are 
guided by consistent standards of conduct in securities transactions, 
the prospect of liability for violating such standards can vary 
significantly from one jurisdiction to another.  Those who argue for 
preemption of states’ enforcement powers seem to be seeking 
uniformity in forbearance from enforcement, rather than the 
uniform application of fraud standards. 
administrative agencies); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative 
State, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 27 (1997) (arguing that public participation in agency rule 
making has an independent democratic value).  
 143. See SHAPIRO, supra note 90, at 119-20. 
 144. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67. 
 145. See Painter, supra note 6, at 60. 
 146. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, I SECURITIES REGULATION 42 (3d. ed. 1998);  
LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, IX SECURITIES REGULATION 4126-40 (3d. ed. 2004). 
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B. Advantages 
 
An integrated corporate governance system which equally 
engages federal and state authorities offers a number of advantages 
over the stilted sphere of influence approach that dominates 
corporate law theory.  The integrated perspective is more respectful 
of democratic principles and can help facilitate more productive 
policy discussions. 
 
1.  Politics and Democracy  
 
Interactive federalism enhances opportunities for public 
participation in the development of corporate law policy and 
broadens citizen’s access to policymakers.  An essential component 
to maintaining a legitimate democracy is broad public participation 
in policy debates.147  Broad political participation creates demands 
for regulators and reform advocates to give reasons for their favored 
policies and allows citizens to challenge those rules, policies, and 
official actions that affect their lives.148
The varying governance structures that exist at the state and 
federal levels provide state and national officials with different sets 
of motivations in developing policies.  At a given point in time, state 
and federal officials (and officials in different states) will have 
incentives to respond differently to various constituency groups.  
Consider the example of corporation statutes.  The undemocratic 
nature of state corporate lawmaking is legendary.149  State 
corporation statutes are drafted by corporate lawyers acting on 
behalf of their business clients under the aegis of local bar 
associations.150  These statutes are typically drafted with minimal 
input from representatives of any constituencies other than 
corporate managers and corporation service companies.151
By contrast, federal legislative and rulemaking processes 
 147. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 
29-30 (2004); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 134 (1993).  For a critique of 
deliberative democracy theory, see Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy’s 
Attempt to Turn Politics into Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (2002). 
 148. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 147, at 101-02, 135. 
 149. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Puzzle of Corporate Law 
1 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 55, 
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=363480 (last visited June 8, 2006).  
 150. Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and 
Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 920 (1990). 
 151. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of 
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 506-09 (1987); Comment, Law For Sale, 
supra note 17, at 868. 
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encompass a broader range of citizen voices. Of course, national 
politicians are subject to considerable influence from interest 
groups, but they are also accountable to the citizens they represent, 
and they risk replacement if they are perceived to ignore voters’ 
most salient concerns.152  The policy perspectives represented in the 
national legislative processes are more inclusive than those that 
hold sway at the state level.  In congressional hearings on major 
reform bills, Congress hears testimony from academics, lobbyists, 
and government officials who provide competing perspectives on the 
proposed legislation.153   
Historically, shareholder interests do not always fare well at the 
national level, but the viewpoints of shareholder advocates are well-
articulated and have tended to moderate the more extreme 
legislative provisions proposed.  For example, the initial versions of 
the PSLRA, NSMIA, and SLUSA were revised significantly to 
remove some of the more extreme provisions that proponents of the 
reforms had sought.154
Although national policymaking processes are more inclusive 
than the states, the risk of interest group dominance remains high.  
For example, the accounting and high-tech industries effectively 
controlled and constrained the regulatory agendas of Congress, the 
SEC, and FASB during the 1990s.  Through this influence, industry 
trade groups secured the passage of preemptive legislation and also 
quashed SEC initiatives to enhance auditor independence and to 
require the expensing of employee stock options.155
An integrated system for corporate regulation, in which both 
federal and state regulators play active roles should help to alleviate 
risks of regulatory capture and improve the prospect that laws will 
reasonably reflect public values.156  The independent power of state 
authorities serves as a counterweight to the power of federal 
regulators and vice-versa.  Increased federal intervention in 
corporate regulation ensures that “two governmental hierarchies 
will be involved in a particular area of governance instead of one,” 
 152. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1, at ___; Romano, Quack Corporate 
Governance, supra note 132, at 1524-25. 
 153. See Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism, supra note 16, at 636-37 n.67; 
Painter, supra note 6, at 19. 
 154. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1, at [53].  For example, early versions of the 
PSLRA included a “loser pays” rule that would require plaintiffs to pay the defendants’ 
costs if they lost their case. See Republican Contract with America, available at 
http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html (last visited June 8, 2006) 
(describing the Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act, H.R. 119, 104th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 1995)); NAGY, ET AL., supra note 68, at 416. 
 155. See LEVITT, supra note 75, at 240-43. 
 156. SHAPIRO, supra note 90, at 80-81. 
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increasing the diffusion of government power.157  Protecting state 
sovereignty in securities enforcement offers a comparable benefit in 
the securities field.158
 
2. Streamlining Debate
 
An integrated perspective on corporate regulation can also serve 
as a brush-clearing mechanism in the corporate law literature.  This 
perspective holds the promise of liberating corporate scholarship 
from the sphere-of-influence mentality, creating space for more 
fruitful discussions of the policy options our nation confronts.  An 
explicit recognition of how federalism arguments distort policy 
discussions should inspire greater reticence among academics to 
engage in policy debates premised on the sphere of influence 
framework. 
An integrated approach suggests a straightforward manner for 
addressing corporate policy problems.  Take a simple paradigm for 
the progression of policy discussions among a collective of 
policymakers and advocates.  Such a discussion would proceed 
through three stages: diagnosis, prescription, and implementation.  
The first step is the diagnostic stage—identifying the problem.  The 
prescriptive stage entails developing policy proposals to address the 
problems identified, and the implementation stage concerns 
strategies for implementing the agreed-upon reforms. 
At the prescriptive stage of debate, questions regarding the 
appropriateness of regulatory intervention should be addressed.  
Proponents of market-solutions or self-regulation have space within 
the prescriptive stage to advance arguments against government 
action.  Participants in the prescriptive discussions would consider 
various regulatory approaches to addressing the problem.  Those 
who agree that legal reform is warranted would work to develop 
solutions to the problems identified. 
Once competing policy approaches and proposals have been 
fully considered, reform proponents should consider strategies for 
implementing needed reforms.  At the implementation stage, the 
discussions would analyze whether it is best to seek reform at the 
national level or whether states should be encouraged to implement 
reforms.  As part of this analysis it is proper to weigh considerations 
of history and tradition, political concerns, externalities and 
 157. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 86, at 933-34 (“The second decision-maker can 
introduce new standards, subject old ones to debate, increase popular awareness, decrease 
arbitrary power, restrain corruption and thereby expand liberty—the liberty of individuals 
from excessive or inappropriate government control.”). 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78; Jones, Dynamic Federalism, supra note 
4, at 123-25. 
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administrative competence.159  These considerations should be 
taken against a backdrop expectation of cooperation among federal 
and state officials in implementing policies that result from a 
democratic decision-making process. 
Those who deny that problems exist or who resist regulatory 
solutions have little to contribute in the implementation phase of 
policy discussions.  Therefore, their efforts to participate in 
implementation debates can fairly be viewed as attempts to thwart 
implementation of proposals developed at the prescriptive stage.  
Certainly valid objections can be raised that challenge the 
conclusions reached at diagnostic and prescriptive stages, but these 
arguments should be articulated and understood as such.  When 
those who dispute the diagnostic or prescriptive conclusions seek to 
dominate the debate at the implementation stage, policymakers and 
commentators should recognize this move and engage those 
arguments only on terms appropriate to the diagnostic or 
prescriptive questions. 
To illustrate, many commentators have criticized the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act that Congress adopted in response to the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals.  Sarbanes-Oxley’s critics charge alternatively 
that the Act was unnecessary, hastily drawn, ineffective, or 
harmful.160  Some focus their objections on the fact that the Act was 
adopted by Congress, and traditionally corporate governance is the 
province of the states.161 This federalization argument against 
Sarbanes-Oxley posits that because Congress has not so directly 
regulated corporate governance in the past, it should not begin to do 
so now.  Under this analysis, Congress cannot fix the legislation; it 
can only repeal it.162  Of course, these critics’ core objection to 
Sarbanes-Oxley is to its substantive provisions rather than its 
provenance.163  Yet, the terms in which they frame the argument 
deflect a direct response to its deregulatory moorings. 
 
C. Challenges 
 
Once we accept the overlap of federal and state authority in 
corporate affairs as legitimate, an important and neglected question 
is how best to manage the challenges that come with maintaining a 
system of concurrent jurisdiction.  A number of objections can be 
 159. Heminway, supra note 140, at 228 (encouraging “an analytical, comparative 
approach to institutional choice” in the establishment of corporate governance rules). 
 160. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: 
A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 61 (2002). 
 161. Id.; Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 27-28. 
 162. Ahdieh, supra note 6, at 731-32. 
 163. See Ribstein, supra note 160, at 61. 
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raised to efforts to maintain redundant layers of authority to govern 
corporate conduct. 
 
1.  Preserving State Autonomy   
 
One problem to be tackled is determining how conflicts between 
federal and state policy should be resolved.  Proponents of 
interactive federalism welcome the reality that national policy will 
sometimes conflict with a state’s approach.  When conflicts arise 
between policies of the national government and that of one or more 
states, they can stimulate a public debate that allows citizens to 
play a role in resolving the conflict.164  Because local and national 
politicians alike are accountable to the public, a debate on the 
merits of a contested state or federal policy affords citizens the 
opportunity to air their views and express their preferences to 
politicians at all levels of government.   
However, federalism proponents are less sanguine about the 
expected outcome of conflicts between state and federal authorities.  
Such federalists often complain that the supremacy clause 
inevitably stacks the deck in favor of the central authority.165  
Congress can use its preemptive powers to deprive citizens of the 
protection of a second level of government to hear their appeals.  If 
federalism is abandoned as a constraining principle, federalists ask, 
what mechanisms will protect states and their citizens from the vast 
expansive powers of the central government?166
The reality is hardly as bleak as federalists would suggest.  
Despite the dramatic expansion of federal power over the centuries, 
states continue to exercise considerable regulatory authority.  For 
whatever reasons, the political safeguards of federalism or the 
strength of political parties, the growth of the federal government 
has not significantly altered the prime role of state and local 
governments in the lives of individual citizens.167
 164. Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten 
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 390 (2003). 
 165. See Hamilton, supra note 95, at 1078. 
 166. See id. (“Congress holds the trump card of preemption, a larger purse and ready 
access to the national media.”); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of 
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” 
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 824 (1998)  (“[W]hat good is the preservation of state 
administrative autonomy, if the states are not guaranteed some area of subject matter 
jurisdiction in which to exercise it?”). 
 167. See SHAPIRO, supra note 90, at 114 (“[A] remarkable proportion of the regulations 
that affect our daily lives  . . . continue as primarily the subject of state and local control.”); 
Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 220 (2000) (“[A] striking fact about government in the United States is 
how much authority is still exercised at the state and local level.”). 
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2.  Avoiding Inefficiencies
 
A second objection to maintaining redundant authority is that 
inefficiencies are created by requiring businesses to deal with 
varying regulatory standards at the federal level and in all fifty 
states. Congress, therefore, should not be discouraged from 
preempting state laws to extricate industry from the burdens of 
excessive regulation. 
This concern, although real, is often overstated.  Through 
restatements of law, uniform laws, and similar coordination efforts, 
states frequently harmonize their laws to minimize regulatory 
disarray.  Furthermore, such tension is an unavoidable consequence 
of maintaining the very governance structure that federalists 
champion.  Despite underlying tension, federal and state regulators 
have demonstrated the ability to work together in many areas of 
concurrent jurisdiction including crime, health and safety and the 
environment.168  In securities enforcement, for example, despite 
clashing egos and differing policy perspectives, Attorney General 
Spitzer and officials from other states found ways to coordinate 
policies and practices with the SEC and the Department of 
Justice.169
CONCLUSION 
 
Traditional federalism concepts contribute little to our 
understanding of how best to address our nation’s corporate 
governance problems.  Federalism values have been invoked 
inconsistently in discussions of allocation of authority—supporting 
state power in corporate law and quietly abiding the trampling of 
such power in securities regulation.  It seems, therefore, that many 
federalism arguments are merely deregulatory arguments in 
disguise.  However, because these deregulatory arguments are 
couched in federalism terms, they serve mainly to distract from 
important substantive debates on whether and how to best regulate 
American corporations. 
An interactive approach to corporate regulation provides a 
better lens through which to evaluate corporate governance policy.  
It provides a more democratic framework for developing corporate 
governance policy and can help free policy discussions from the 
distractions created by confusing and ultimately hollow distinctions 
between corporate and securities law. 
 168. Jones, Dynamic Federalism, supra note 4, at 130. 
 169. Id. at 119, 121. 
